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RECOGNITION OF A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
ABUSIVE DISCHARGE IN MARYLAND
Gil A. Abramsont
Stephen M. Silvestritt
In recent years, courts in other jurisdictions have created
certain exceptions to the general rule that an at-will em-
ployee may be terminated without cause. The Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland, in the recent case of Adler v. American
Standard Corp., limited the at-will rule by recognizing a
cause of action for abusive discharge. In this article, the
authors trace the development of the at-will rule and ex-
ceptions to it carved out by courts and legislatures. After
reviewing certain facets of the law of abusive discharge in
other jurisdictions, the authors examine the Adler case
and discuss the possible ramifications of this decision.
I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, despite widespread criticism,1 courts in Mary-
land and other jurisdictions have remained faithful to the common
law rule that an employment contract for an indefinite period of
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sentation of management in labor and employment relations law, and he is a member
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tt B.A., Providence College, 1976; J.D., Catholic University School of Law, 1979. Mr.
Silvestri practices in the area of labor and employment relations law, and he is
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1. See Blades, Employment At Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting The Abusive
Exercise Of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405-06 (1967); Peck, Unjust
Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change In The Law, 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 1,
1-10 (1979); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissak Time For A
Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 482, 484, 519, 532 (1976); Comment, Protecting At Will
Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty To Terminate Only In Good
Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1817, 1832-34, 1836, 1844 (1980); Note, The Employ-
mentAt Will Rule, 31 ALA. L. REV. 421, 435-45 (1980); Note, Non-Statutory Causes
Of Action For An Employer's Termination Of An "At Will" Employment Relation-
ship: A Possible Solution To The Economic Imbalance In The Employer-Employee
Relationship, 24 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 743, 744 n.10, 765, 769 (1979); Note, A Personal
Damage Remedy For The Employee At Wilk A Reappraisal Of A Recent Proposal 22
S.D. L. REV. 431, 438, 446 (1977); Note, Implied Contract Rights To Job Security, 26
STAN. L. REV. 335, 336-40 (1974). See also Comment, Protecting The Private Sector
At Will Employee Who "Blows The Whistle": A Cause Of Action Based Upon
Determinants Of Public Policy, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 777.
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time is terminable at the will of either the employer or the em-
ployee.2 Notwithstanding its lengthy tenancy as part of the com-
mon law of the employment relationship, a number of legislatures
and an increasing number of courts have carved out exceptions to
the at-will rule.3 These exceptions limit the right of an employer to
discharge an employee.
In Maryland, the at-will rule has not remained unscathed. Re-
cently, in Adler v. American Standard Corp.,4 the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland limited the at-will rule by recognizing a cause of
action for abusive discharge.' Accordingly, discharges contrary to
"clear mandate of public policy"6 may be considered abusive, and
terminated employees may have access to judicial review even in
the absence of any statutory protection.
Seeking redress for the termination of his employment,
Gerald Adler filed suit against his employer, American Standard,
in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.'
The complaint alleged that, in the course of his employment as As-
sistant General Manager, Adler discovered many inadequate and
possibly illegal practices and methods of operation.8 After report-
ing these improprieties to his employer's headquarters,9 Adler re-
ceived a letter from his immediate supervisor terminating his em-
ployment for unsatisfactory performance. 10 The complaint further
alleged that the motivation for Adler's discharge was the em-
ployer's desire to conceal the illegalities that Adler might have
disclosed and that the discharge was contrary to the public policy
of the law of Maryland."
Citing the long-standing employment at-will rule, American
Standard moved to dismiss the complaint. Adler contended that
2. State Comm'n on Human Relations v. Amecon Div. of Litton Syss., Inc., 278 Md.
120, 126, 360 A.2d 1, 5 (1976); see 53 AM. JUR. 2d Master and Servant § 27, at 104 n.16
and cases cited therein. See also 9 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 1017 (3d ed. 1957). The at-will rule traces its ancestry to a treatise by H. G.
Wood in the late nineteenth century. See H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
MASTER AND SERVANT 272-77 (2d ed. 1886).
3. See text accompanying notes 24-94 infra
4. 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981).
5. Id at 47, 432 A.2d at 471.
6. Id
7. Id at 32, 432 A.2d at 466.
8. The amended complaint identified the potential illegalities as the following:
a. Attempts to treat capital expenditures as expenses.
b. Payment of commercial bribes.
c. Falsification of sales and income information, and alteration of commercial
documents to support the falsified information.
d. Misuse of corporate funds by officers for their personal benefit.
e. Manipulation of work-in-process inventory information.
f. Alteration of forecasts in connection with intra-corporate financial reporting.
Id
9. Id The complaint alleged that Adler was praised by high level management for his
candor and that he was assured that his disclosure of the improprieties would not en-
danger his employment. Id
10. Adler's immediate superiors first requested his resignation. Id
11. Id
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he was entitled to maintain his cause of action for abusive dis-
charge. The district court, through Judge Alexander Harvey II,
certified to the Court of Appeals of Maryland the question of
whether Maryland law recognizes an action for abusive discharge. 12
In its opinion, the court of appeals compared the uniform
long-standing acceptance of the at-will rule in Maryland with deci-
sions in other jurisdictions, which have recognized a cause of ac-
tion for abusive discharge pursuant to some legislatively ex-
pressed public policy.13 Citing these decisions as a basis for its rea-
soning, the court recognized an exception to the at-will rule and
concluded that an action for abusive discharge may be maintained
against an employer who acts in violation of a clear mandate of
public policy." The court also indicated that continued employ-
ment should not be jeopardized by an employee's refusal to act un-
lawfully or by an employee's insistence on performing an act re-
quired by law.1 5
While the court of appeals recognized the existence of a cause
of action for abusive discharge, the court found that the allega-
tions of the complaint were insufficient to maintain such an action
because Adler failed to describe the manner in which any specific
statute he cited was violated by his employer.16 In addition, the
court found that his averments did not "otherwise demonstrate a
violation of a clear mandate of the public policy of this State." 7
This article examines the at-will rule and the exception to it
recognized in Adler, in light of the development of the law of abu-
sive discharge in other jurisdictions. The possible ramifications of
the decision are also discussed.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE AT-WILI
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
A. The At-Will Rule
It was established early in Maryland's history that no action
for breach of an employment contract would lie unless the employ-
12. The court certified the following questions:
1. Is a cause of action for "abusive discharge" recognized under the substan-
tive law of the State of Maryland?
2. Do the allegations of the Amended Complaint, if taken as true, state a
cause of action for "abusive discharge" under the substantive law of
Maryland?
I& at 32, 432 A.2d at 465. See generally MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-601
(1980).
13. 291 Md. 31, 38-42, 432 A.2d 464, 467-71 (1981).
14. Id at 47, 432 A.2d at 471.
15. See id. at 38-39, 42, 43, 432 A.2d at 468-69, 470, 471.
16. Id at 46, 432 A.2d at 471. For a discussion of the court's analysis, see notes 95-106
and accompanying text infra.
17. 291 Md. 31, 44, 432 A.2d 464, 471 (1981).
1981]
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ment agreement was for a definite term.'8 Indeed, for many years
after the Industrial Revolution, the at-will rule remained un-
changed: in the absence of an express or implied contractual pro-
vision regarding termination, an employment agreement was ter-
minable at the will of either party.1 9 Thus, under the at-will rule, an
employee could be discharged for any reason, even whim, caprice,
prejudice, or malice.20
The development of the at-will doctrine in Maryland did not
differ from the application of the rule in other jurisdictions. Ac-
cordingly, in most states the at-will rule permitted an employer to
discharge an employee for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all
without incurring liability for breach of the employment contract
or for abusive or wrongful discharge.2 1 The at-will rule was so
firmly embedded in the common law of the United States that it
was codified in several jurisdictions 2 and recognized by the
United States Supreme Court.2 Although the at-will rule still
exists today in most jurisdictions, courts and legislatures in many
states and the federal government have carved out certain excep-
tions to this rule.
B. Statutory Restrictions on the Right to Discharge At Will
Congress and various state legislatures have prohibited the
summary discharge of an at-will employee for specified reasons or
18. Washington, B. & A. R.R. v. Moss, 127 Md. 12, 96 A. 273 (1915). See also Lemlich v.
Board of Trustees, 282 Md. 495, 385 A.2d 1185 (1978) (A contract fixing a definite
term of employment can only be terminated by just cause or with mutual consent.).
The measure of damages recoverable in a breach of employment contract action
is the amount of salary the employee would have earned in his position less the
amount he actually earned after his discharge or the amount he might have in the
exercise of reasonable diligence in seeking similar employment. See Atholwood Dev.
Co. v. Houston, 179 Md. 441, 446, 19 A.2d 706, 708 (1941). See also Lemlich v. Board
of Trustees, 282 Md. at 505, 385 A.2d at 1191.
19. See State Comm'n on Human Relations v. Amecon Div. of Litton Syss., Inc., 278 Md.
120, 126, 360 A.2d 1, 5 (1976); Vincent v. Palmer, 179 Md. 365, 370-71, 19 A.2d 183,
187 (1941); Washington, B. & A. R.R. v. Moss, 127 Md. 12, 21, 96 A. 273, 276 (1915).
20. See Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421, 427, 178 A. 109, 112 (1935); Willnee v. Silver-
man, 109 Md. 341, 355-56, 71 A. 962, 964 (1909).
21. Courts in the states of Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washing-
ton, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia have included this doc-
trine within the common law. See Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 271 (1975).
22. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 66-101 (1979).
23. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172-76 (1908).
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upon a specified motive.2 4 The primary statutory schemes that
limit an employer's right to discharge an at-will employee are the
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act 25 and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.26 The Taft-Hartley Act prohibits,
inter alia, discharge for exercising the right to organize and select
an employee representative. 27 Title VII prohibits any discharge
based upon discrimination with regard to race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.2 8 In enforcing these statutes, courts have main-
tained that an employer is free to discharge an employee for any
reason except those specifically prohibited by the statutes.2 9
Similar statutes limiting the right to discharge include the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 30 the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970,31 the Vietnam Era Veterans Read-
justment Assistance Act,32 the Fair Labor Standards Act,33 and
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 34 While various state statutes con-
tain similar limitations on the right to discharge, some states have
expanded their prohibitions to include restrictions on termination
for failure to take a polygraph or lie detector test35 or because of
discrimination based upon criminal conviction.36
24. United States government employees, as well as various state and municipal
employees, cannot be discharged without a hearing and, in some instances, govern-
ment employees cannot be fired except upon a showing of cause. See Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. 4 7513 (Supp. IV 1980). This Act provides that a
covered government agency may remove or otherwise discipline a covered employee
only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the Civil Service. The statute also
provides a notice period prior to adverse action and affords the employee the right to
be represented by an attorney and the right to a written decision enumerating the
reasons for the action taken. Id.
25. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-157 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
26. 42 U.S.C. 44 2000e-1 to -17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
27. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1976).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
29. See, e.g., NLRB v. Condenser Corp. of America, 128 F.2d 67, 77 (3d Cir. 1942). But see
Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All Workers Are Entitled To "Just Cause" Protec-
tion Under Title VII, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 519, 520, 561-63, 565 (1978) (Title VII erases
the common law at-will rule by requiring equal treatment of all employees).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1976) (prohibiting discrimination based on age).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976) (prohibiting discrimination against an employee for asser-
tion of rights guaranteed under the Act).
32. 38 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(A)(i), (B), (b)(1) (1976) (guaranteeing the right to re-employment
upon satisfactory completion of military service and prohibiting discharge "without
cause" within one year after re-employment).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1976) (prohibiting discharge of an employee for filing any com-
plaint or instituting any proceeding under the Act).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. IV 1980) (requiring affirmative action to advance the employ-
ment of handicapped individuals by government contractors or subcontractors). But
see Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.) (Rehabilitation Act does not
authorize private action for damages by a dismissed employee), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
889 (1980).
35. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-903 (Supp. 1980). Some states prohibit any use of the
lie detector or polygraph test but fail to grant an express private right of action for
damages. See, e.g., iMASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 19B (West Supp. 1975).
36. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 335B.010(4) (Baldwin 1981).
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Under the Maryland Code, it is unlawful to discharge any em-
ployee "because of ... race, color, religion, sex, age, national
origin, marital status, or physical or mental handicap unrelated in
nature and extent so as to reasonably preclude the performance of
the employment. 3 7 Similarly, other statutes limit the right of a
Maryland employer to discharge an at-will employee for partici-
pating in proceedings under the Maryland Occupational Safety
and Health Act,38 for filing a workmen's compensation claim,3 9 for
refusing to take a polygraph or similar test as a condition of con-
tinued employment,4 for having his wages attached, 41 or for serv-
ing on a jury.42
This seemingly abundant cache of statutory limitations on
the right to discharge at will belies the fact that no state, includ-
ing Maryland, has enacted any legislation providing any general
alteration or abolition of the at-will rule. Rather, the piecemeal re-
striction of the right to discharge at will by the legislatures may
be the result of their tacit acknowledgement of the continued vi-
tality of that common law doctrine.
C. The Public Policy Exception
In recent years, courts have created exceptions to the at-will
rule in order to defeat the harshness of its application in certain
circumstances. Generally, in limiting the at-will rule, these courts
have adopted one of three theories to justify the departure from
established precedent. The courts have held that a cause of action
exists when the termination violated some expressed public
policy,43 when the employer acted in bad faith without justifica-
tion," or when the employer violated a duty of good faith and fair
dealing implied in every at-will employment contract.4 Because
Adler v. American Standard Corp.46 appears to adopt the public
policy theory, this article focuses on the scope of that exception to
the at-will rule.
While the public policy exception is the most limited intrusion
upon the scope of the at-will rule, it has the largest judicial follow-
37. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16(a)(1) (1979).
38. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, § 43 (1979).
39. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 39A (1979).
40. MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95 (1979).
41. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 15-606 (1980).
42. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 8-105, -401 (1980).
43. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
44. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
45. See Fortune v. National Cash Register, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
46. 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981).
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ing.47 Simply stated, this exception provides that an employer is
not free to discharge an employee at will when the reason for that
discharge is an intention on the part of the employer to contravene
the public policy of the state.48
The parameters of the public policy exception adopted in
Adler can best be examined by a review of the analyses employed
by other jurisdictions in adopting this exception. The numerous
cases that arise as a result of discharge for filing a workmen's
compensation claim provide one framework for review of the Adler
decision.49 In Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co.,50 one of the
first cases in which a court recognized a cause of action for abu-
sive discharge, the plaintiff was discharged after filing a claim
with the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Commission. She
then brought a tort action against her employer, alleging that the
employer intentionally violated the legislative intent underlying
the workmen's compensation laws.6' After discussing the intent of
the legislature in enacting the workmen's compensation laws, the
Indiana Supreme Court concluded that an employee who alleges
that she was retaliatorily discharged for filing a workmen's com-
pensation claim states a cause of action for damages. 52 Although
the Frampton court permitted a cause of action for retaliatory dis-
charge, it carefully limited the tort as an exception to the common
law at-will rule.53 While the court reasoned that a dismissal of the
47. See Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977); Petermann v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters,'174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959); Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas
Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Murphy v. City of Topeka, 630 P.2d 186
(Kan. 1981); Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 511 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1977); Sventko v.
Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J.
Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975);
Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978);
Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 746 (1977); Harless v.
First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978). Other states have in-
dicated that the theory would be accepted in a proper case. See Lampe v.
Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978); Jackson v.
Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977); Abrisz v. Pulley Freight
Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978); Stephens v. Justiss-Mears Oil Co., 300 So.
2d 510 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Chin v. American Tel. & TeL, 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410
N.Y.S.2d 737 (1978).
48. See Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 647, 245 N.W.2d 151, 153 (1976).
49. See generally Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 979 (1975). The workmen's compensation cases
present a useful structure for analysis of this new cause of action. Maryland,
however, has prohibited by statute any discharge for filing a workmen's compensa-
tion claim. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 39A (1979).
50. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
51. Id at 250, 297 N.E.2d at 426-27. She claimed actual and punitive damages as a result
. of her discharge. d at 250, 297 N.E.2d at 426.
52. Id at 253, 297 N.E.2d at 428. The court analogized a retaliatory discharge in the
workplace to the retaliatory eviction of a tenant for reporting housing code viola-
tions. Id
53. Id The court stated that absent a retaliatory discharge, or "under ordinary circum-
stances," an employee at will may be discharged without cause. Id
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case would chill the exercise of an expressly stated right to file a
compensation claim, it based its decision on the conclusion that a
retaliatory discharge was a "device" which operated to relieve the
employer from liability and, as such, was expressly prohibited by
the Indiana statute.5'
In recognizing a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, the
Frampton court was able to identify a specific provision of the
workmen's compensation statute that was violated by the em-
ployer. In Sventko v. Kroger Co.,1 5 however, a Michigan court
found a similar cause of action in the absence of any express viola-
tion of the workmen's compensation statute.5 6 As in Frampton,
the Sventko court limited the newly created action to complaints
alleging that the reason for the discharge was an employer's inten-
tion to violate public policy.57 Similarly, in Kelsay v. Motorola,
Inc., 58 the Supreme Court of Illinois recognized a tort action for re-
taliatory discharge for filing a workmen's compensation claim
only as a limited exception to the general proposition that the em-
ployer may discharge an at-will employee without cause.59
The Frampton line of cases, however, has not been followed
consistently. In Christy v. Petrus,60 the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri found that a new civil cause of action for retaliatory dis-
charge for filing a workmen's compensation claim would not be
created unless the cause of action was expressly stated in the stat-
ute or appeared to be sanctioned by clear legislative intent.61 Cit-
ing provisions for criminal and civil causes of action in other Mis-
souri statutes, the court concluded that the absence of similar pro-
54. Id The statute provides that "[n]o contract or agreement, written or implied, no rule,
regulation or other device shall, in any manner, operate to relieve any employer in
whole or in part of any obligation created by ... this article." IND. CODE ANN. §
22-3-2-15 (Burns 1974).
55. 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976).
56. Id at 647, 245 N.W.2d at 153. The court did conclude that the compensation statute
prohibiting discharge before employees qualified for benefits provided sufficient
evidence for creation of the tort action. Id at 648-49, 245 N.W.2d at 154; see MICH.
COMp. LAWS § 418.125 (1976). Concurring, Judge Allen reasoned that the result did
not extend the workmen's compensation statute because the statute's clear purpose
was to protect employees from work injuries. 69 Mich. App. 644, 652, 245 N.W.2d
151, 155 (1976) (Allen, J., concurring).
57. 69 Mich. App. 644, 647, 245 N.W.2d 151, 153 (1976).
58. 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
59. Id at 184, 384 N.E.2d at 357. Rejection of the cause of action, the court stated, would
erode the Workmen's Compensation Act by eliminating any statutory remedies for
employees with compensable injuries. The cause of action was implicit in the "fun-
damental purpose of [the act] which is to ensure rights and remedies to employees
who have compensable claims." Id at 186, 384 N.E.2d at 358. See also Brown v.
Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978); Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas, 533
S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
60. 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956).
61. Id at 1192, 295 S.W.2d at 126.
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visions in the workmen's compensation statute indicated a legisla-
tive intent to bar creation of a remedy for wrongful discharge.6 2
On this basis, other courts have refused to follow the reasoning of
Frampton and Sventko.6 3
A second area of limitation on the right to discharge at will
lies in actions brought for discharge based on a failure during the
scope of employment to perform an act that is forbidden by law.
In Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters64 the
plaintiff was instructed by his employer to give false testimony
under oath and, after testifying truthfully, he was discharged. The
California court refused to dismiss a wrongful discharge action
alleging a breach of the employment contract and concluded that
the strong state policy against perjury compelled the denial of the
employer's unlimited right to discharge at-will employees.65 As in
Frampton, the Petermann court relied on an express statutory
provision, which in this case prohibited the solicitation of perjury,
and reasoned that the prohibition fosters strong public policies
that support the creation of the civil remedy.66 Similarly, in
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 67 the plaintiff alleged that he
was wrongfully discharged for refusing to participate in an illegal
price-fixing scheme.6s Finding a cause of action based on contract
and tort principles, the California Supreme Court concluded that,
even in the absence of an explicit statutory provision prohibiting
the discharge of a worker on such grounds, fundamental principles
of public policy and "adherence to the objectives underlying the
state's penal statutes required the recognition of a rule barring an
employer from discharging an employee who has simply complied
with his legal duty and has refused to commit an illegal act. '69
62. Id at 1193-94, 295 S.W.2d at 126-27.
63. See Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp., 364 So. 2d 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Dockerey v.
Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246
S.E.2d 215 (1978). In Dockerey, the North Carolina Court of Appeals refused to limit
the at-will rule, concluding that the creation of the retaliatory discharge tort would
best be left to the legislature. Id, at 300, 244 S.E.2d at 276.
64. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
65. Id at 185, 344 P.2d at 27.
66. Id. But see Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 CaL 3d 167, 174 n.8, 610 P.2d 1330,
1334 n.8, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 843 n.8 (1980). (Petermann decision not based upon find-
ing that employer violated the statutory provision prohibiting solicitation of
perjury).
67. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
68. 1I at 169, 610 P.2d at 1331, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 840. According to the complaint, defen-
dants had violated express provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Cartwright
Act, and a consent decree entered in federal litigation. Id, at 170, 610 P.2d at 1331,
164 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
69. Id. at 174, 610 P.2d at 1333-34, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
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In other cases, courts have permitted a cause of action for
wrongful discharge when an employee was terminated for at-
tempting to force an employer to operate within the requirements
of state and federal consumer acts, 70 for requesting jury duty after
receiving a state summons,7' and for refusing to submit to a poly-
graph examination. 72 Some courts appear to be willing to permit
employees to maintain abusive discharge actions in the wake of
termination for complaining that a company product was danger-
ous.73 Generally, courts creating a non-statutory cause of action
for wrongful discharge premise a decision upon an explicit finding
that some legislatively expressed public policy has been violated
by the employer's act of terminating the employee.
This premise is most evident in those decisions which have re-
stricted the application of the public policy exception. In Geary v.
United States Steel Corp.,7' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held that a plaintiff must allege and prove a violation of a "clear
mandate" of public policy in order to maintain an action against
his employer for wrongful discharge.7 5 Furthermore, the court an-
nounced that liability would be found only if the employer had
specific intent to violate public policy or to harm the employee as
evidenced by its actions. 76 Thus, a mere perception by an em-
70. See Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978). The
Harless result was based in part on the finding that the Credit Reporting Act pro-
vides for civil remedies for people subjected to violations of the Act. I& at 276. But
see McCabe v. City of Eureka, 500 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (no private right of ac-
tion implied from the Consumer Credit Act prohibition of discharge of employee
whose earnings have been subjected to garnishment for any single indebtedness).
71. See Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (community interest and partici-
pation on jury is so important that the employer's intentional termination would give
rise to compensation); cf. Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 28,
386 A.2d 119 (1978) (cause of action recognized for intentional termination of an em-
ployee who left employment for one week for jury duty; the trial court erred in dis-
missing plaintiff's action because he was fired for failing to notify the employer that
he would be away for jury duty).
72. Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (anti-polygraph
statute cited as a basis for cause of action).
73. See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974). While the
Geary court refused to permit the plaintiff to prosecute his wrongful discharge ac-
tion, finding that there was no evidence supporting an inference that he was fired for
refusing to perform an illegal act or otherwise endangering the safety of others, it in-
timated that such a cause of action would exist if the employer transgressed from ex-
pressed public policy by terminating the plaintiff. I& at 175, 319 A.2d at 178. Cf
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.. 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (discharge for
refusal to test or promote dangerous product in violation of statute or regulation may
give rise to cause of action for abusive discharge).
74. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
75. Id at 179, 319 A.2d at 180.
76. The court in Geary concluded:
If a general intent in the sense that an employer knew or should have known
the probable consequences of his act were all that a disgruntled employee
need show in order to make out a cause of action, the privilege of discharge
would be effectively eradicated for some degree of harm is normally
foreseeable whenever an employee is dismissed.
Id at 175. 319 A.2d at 177.
ployee that a public policy may have been violated is insufficient
to support a cause of action for retaliatory discharge.77
Similarly, in Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District,78 the
plaintiff was discharged for selling scrap to fill an unauthorized
employee Christmas fund.79 The Idaho court dismissed the allega-
tion of wrongful discharge because the plaintiff failed to demon-
strate that the effect of the discharge infringed upon public
policy.8 0 In Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,"' a New Jersey
court concluded that the discharge of an employee for actions con-
sistent with her interpretation of duties arising under the Hippo-
cratic Oath did not satisfy the requirement of a violation of a clear
mandate of public policy. 2 A number of courts have dismissed
complaints upon similar grounds, concluding that the conduct
alleged did not violate any express public policy.8 3
Further restrictions on the applicability of the public policy
exception have been imposed to extinguish causes of action for
abusive discharge when the acts alleged can be remedied by other
means. For example, in Hughes Tool Co. v. Richards,8 a grievance
contesting the plaintiff's discharge was filed by his collective bar-
gaining representative."5 After an initial adverse determination,
the union requested review of the matter in conformance with the
77. Id at 176, 319 A.2d at 178; see Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App.
465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978) (no cause of action when discharge premised upon plaintiff's
refusal to reduce staff overtime as requested, despite employee's contention that the
reduction would endanger patients).
78. 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977).
79. Id at 332, 563 P.2d at 56. The plaintiff was fired for participation in a "Christmas
party fund" receiving monies from the unauthorized sale of company products and
waste. Id
80. Id at 334, 563 P.2d at 58.
81. 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
82. Id at 72, 417 A.2d at 512. The employee refused to participate in work on a product
she thought was unsafe. Id at 62-63, 417 A.2d at 507.
83. See Rogers v. International Business Machs. Corp., 500 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1980)
(no cause of action for termination after investigation of personal matter alleged to
have violated the rights of privacy of the plaintiff); Percival v. General Motors Corp.,
400 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (no cause of action for discharge made in retalia-
tion of attempt to inform outside business associates of misleading information),
affd, 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976); Rozier v. St. Mary's Hosp., 88 Iln. App. 3d 994,411
N.E.2d 50 (1980) (no cause of action for termination for leaking information concern-
ing abuse of patients to newspapers); Martin v. Platt, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. Ct. App.
1979) (no cause of action for discharge for reporting a supervisor taking kickbacks);
Scrogham v. Kraft Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1977) (discharge of an employee who
announced an intention to attend law school at night did not violate public policy);
Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1980) (no cause of action for dismissal of
sales employee in retaliation for his complaint that service of product was insuffi-
cient); Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 5-36 (1980) (no public
policy to support cause of action for discharge and retaliation for living with a fellow
employee).
84. 610 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
85. Id at 234.
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next step of the grievance and arbitration procedure of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement and, upon review, the initial determina-
tion was upheld.8 6 After the union did not pursue the matter, the
plaintiff brought suit alleging that he was wrongfully terminated
for filing a workmen's compensation claim. 87 The court dismissed
the action concluding that "one who elected to proceed through a
grievance procedure provided in a contract between his Union and
his employer may not file suit... after 'a final settlement of deter-
mination' has been made following a grievance hearing pursuant
to the employment contract." 8 While the court concluded that an
employee must elect to file suit or to proceed under the employ-
ment contract before final settlement of the grievance occurs, 9 it
specifically refused to define a general rule for identification of the
type of "final settlement" that would preclude an action for abu-
sive discharge. 90
Similarly, state and federal employment relations statutes
may foreclose a discharged employee from fashioning a tort or
contract action for wrongful discharge because of race, age, color,
sex, or national origin without first exhausting administrative
remedies provided by statute.91 In Wehr v. Burroughs Corp.,92 the
plaintiff argued that the Pennsylvania human relations statute es-
tablished a clear public policy permitting an action for abusive dis-
charge based upon age discrimination, but the court concluded
that the mere finding that certain conduct contravenes public
policy is not sufficient in itself to warrant creation of a contract
remedy for wrongful discharge. 93 Reasoning further that the cases
creating a right for abusive discharge are based, in part, upon the
fact that before creation of the action the employees were other-
wise without a remedy, the court dismissed that portion of the
plaintiff's case alleging breach of contract: "If these [public] poli-
86. I1L The plaintiff, who was discharged for, inter alia, using profane language before a
supervisor, interrupted the grievance review meeting with outbursts, and the
employer and the union agreed to adjourn the meeting upholding the discharge. Id
87. Id at 233.
88. Id at 235.
89. Id
90. The Hughes Tool court compared the facts of the case before it with those found in
Carnation v. Broner, 610 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980). In Carnation, the court permitted
the plaintiff to maintain an abusive discharge suit after he had filed a grievance but
before the grievance was resolved. Id. at 452.
91. See Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
92. 438 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
93. Id at 1054.
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cies or goals are preserved by other remedies, then the public pol-
icy is sufficiently saved.94
Most jurisdictions recognizing the public policy exception
seem to have carefully ensured the continued vitality of the at-will
rule by requiring that the effect of the discharge violate some
public policy as expressed by a legislative enactment. Adler,
however, seems to indicate that this legislative pronouncement
may not be necessary in all circumstances.
III. ADLER V. AMERICAN STANDARD CORP.:
APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTION IN MARYLAND
In Adler, the Court of Appeals of Maryland relied on the
reasoning of Frampton9" and Tameny96 to establish the public
policy exception as part of the common law of the state.9 7 The
analysis of the Adler court focused upon judicial attempts to
structure and define the public policy exception. The cases cited
presented wide and varying patterns that suggested the param-
eters of the action for abusive discharge. For example, the court of
appeals cited the Pierce requirement that there be a violation of a
clear mandate of public policy.98 Similarly, the court of appeals
adopted the limitation regarding specific intent constructed in
Geary. 99 The Adler court seemed to emphasize that no cause of ac-
94. Id. at 1055. The court further reasoned that the breadth of the human relations
statute firmly closed any interstices depriving an aggrieved individual of a remedy
for employment discrimination. Id. at 1056. Contra, McKenney v. National Dairy
Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108, 1118 (D. Mass. 1980) (Massachusetts doctrine of applied
covenant of good faith in employment contracts supports a cause of action for
wrongful discharge based upon age in the face of a comprehensive remedy contained
in the Massachusetts Employment Relations Act).
95. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973). See notes 50-54 and accompanying text supra.
96. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). See notes 67-69 and accom-
panying text supra.
97. 291 Md. 31, 37, 38, 43, 432 A.2d 464,468, 471 (1981). The court cited Petermann v. In-
ternational Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959), with ap-
proval. Among the numerous cases cited and discussed by the court were two that
significantly alter the at-will rule. In Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316
A.2d 549 (1974), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire concluded that a cause of ac-
tion in contract for abusive discharge is proper when the termination is motivated by
bad faith or malice or is based on retaliation. Id at 133, 316 A.2d at 551. By implying
a good faith commitment in every at-will relationship, the Monge rule all but erases
the at-will doctrine. Similarly, in Fortune v. National Cash Register, 373 Mass. 96,
364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977), the court, citing Monge, fashioned an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in the at-will contract which would bar any discharge in
bad faith. Id. at 104, 364 N.E.2d at 1257. Like Monge, the Fortune court's reasoning
represents a nearly complete alteration of the at-will rule. See also Pugh v. See's Can-
dies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
98. 291 Md. 31, 41, 432 A.2d 464, 470 (1981).
99. Id. at 43-44, 432 A.2d at 471. The court concluded that Adler's complaint did not
assert that the company's actions were done with an intent to defraud stockholders
or the public in violation of Maryland law. Id,
tion can be maintained in the absence of a clear mandate of public
policy;100 however, it did not limit the newfound cause of action to
situations in which the legislature had explicitly or implicitly de-
clared the public policy of the state.
In this regard, the court of appeals hinted that a suit based
upon notions of public policy undeclared by the legislature may be
proper '0 1 by reserving for itself and the circuit courts the preroga-
tive to determine when a particular discharge contravened ex-
pressed or undeclared principles of public policy.10 2 Moreover, the
court identified sources of public policy other than statutory, in-
cluding judicial pronouncements. The court forewarned, however,
that a divination of public policy without statutory basis would in-
volve a "very nebulous concept. ' '103
Further, the court of appeals ignored the employer's assertion
that any alteration of the at-will doctrine should be relegated to
the legislature.10 4 However, while the court concluded that it had
authority to create the public policy exception upon a finding that
"the common law is no longer suitable to the circumstances of our
people," ° the court did not make any express findings that the
circumstances had changed sufficiently to support the creation of
a new cause of action.10 6
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ADLER DECISION
At most, Adler strikes a balance between the employee's in-
terest in job security in the face of a refusal to act in an unlawful
manner with an employer's interest in discharging an at-will em-
ployee for the benefit of the business. The court, by permitting
public policy to be created without legislative guidance, fosters an
ad hoc determination of public policy in each case, while doing lit-
100. See id. at 42, 432 A.2d at 470-71.
101. Id. at 45, 432 A.2d at 472. The court provided no explanation as to the sources of
undeclared public policy.
102. Id. Similarly, in Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., the Connecticut Supreme
Court concluded that it would decide "where and how to trace the line between claims
that genuinely involve mandates of public policy and are actionable, and ordinary dis-
putes between employer and employee which are not." 179 Conn. 471, 477, 427 A.2d
385, 387 (1980), quoted in Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 39, 432
A.2d 464, 469 (1981).
103. 291 Md. 31, 45, 432 A.2d 464, 472 (1981).
104. Brief for Appellee at 50, Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31,432 A.2d 464
(1981).
105. 291 Md. 31, 42-43, 432 A.2d 464, 471 (1981) iciting Condore v. Prince George's
County, 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (1981); Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d
929 (1980)).
106. The Adler court applied the reasoning of those jurisdictions recognizing the public
policy exception. While citing the increasing public emphasis on job security, the
court disavowed that finding as a basis for the creation of the new tort, "whenever
the termination appeared 'wrongful' to a court or jury." 291 Md. 31,42,432 A.2d 464,
470 (1981).
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tle to assist employers in making any determination concerning
continuing employment of their employees. Likewise, the vague
concept of public policy will not guide employees in their actions
in the workplace. Nevertheless, the court adopted this seemingly
expansive public policy exception despite recognition of the con-
tinued vitality of the at-will rule.107 In view of this, Maryland
courts will face a difficult task of reconciling the public policy ex-
ception with the at-will doctrine.
Conceptually, the Adler decision creates some confusion over
the scope of the public policy exception. The difficulty is the result
of the inability to define adequately the term "public policy" in
the context of wrongful discharge actions. It is submitted that
adoption of parameters of the public policy exception beyond
those clearly expressed by the legislature is an action perilously
close to judicial legislation.08 The public policy exception should
be based upon commission of some act prohibited by a state or
federal statute and the Maryland courts should adopt a single
process for determining whether a private cause of action by a dis-
charged employee should be allowed.
The United States Supreme Court has adopted such an ap-
proach to recognize private causes of action based upon federal
statutes that do not expressly provide for such a remedy, by out-
lining specific factors that must be considered in the analysis: (1)
whether the plaintiff is a member of the class of persons for whose
benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether the legislature has im-
plicitly or explicitly manifested any intent to create or deny such a
remedy; and (3) whether it is consistent with the underlying pur-
poses of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy. 09 Al-
though this method of analysis was fashioned for federal courts"0
construing federal statutes, it will suffice to provide a framework
for creation of causes of action in state courts based upon alleged
conduct that does not violate a specific statutory scheme. This ap-
proach has been adopted in at least one instance to bar an action
for wrongful discharge based upon an alleged violation of the Cus-
tomer Credit Protection Act."'
107. Id at 43-45, 432 A.2d at 471-72.
108. Similarly, relegating the definition and/or application of the public policy to the jury
is inconsistent with the principle premise of the public policy exception: the
employer's act must transgress some public policy clearly defined by the legislature.
109. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). See also Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074,
1078 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980).
110. Significantly, federal courts have expanded powers in the area of collective bargain-
ing agreements. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
111. See McCabe v. City of Eureka, 500 F. Supp. 59, 61 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
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The absence of a clear definition of public policy presents an
additional concern. Creation of a common law cause of action for
wrongful discharge based upon a violation of a clear mandate of
declared public policy, coupled with a vague and incomplete de-
scription of the scope and meaning of the term, may load the
dockets of the circuit courts with myriad actions that are based on
a variety of fact scenarios.1 2 Moreover, the differing bases of each
termination decision may undercut the precedential effect of prior
rulings concerning other employees and may postpone disposition
of otherwise meritless cases until evidence can be taken.
While Adler constructed the abusive discharge cause of action
as an intentional tort,113 this theory is most difficult to reconcile
with a number of long-standing principles. Adoption of the tort
basis for abusive discharge actions may expose employers to com-
pensatory and punitive damages. However, the remedies of puni-
tive damages and, in some regard, compensatory damages are
inconsistent with the relief afforded under the Taft-Hartley Act'1 4
and Title VII, I 5 as well as various Maryland statutes,"I6 all of
which pervasively regulate many aspects of employment rela-
tions. Additionally, the availability of punitive damages for
wrongful discharge places the at-will employee in a better position
than his counterpart who is a member of a collective bargaining
unit employed under a written contract with procedures for reso-
lution of discharge grievances.1 7 Since the basis of an action for
wrongful discharge is the at-will relationship and the contract for
employment for an indefinite period, remedies should attempt to
make the discharged employee whole and not punish the
employer.
112. In 1977, it was estimated that the rate of terminations, forced or voluntary resigna-
tions, or separations from employment was 3.8 per every 100 employees per month.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES Table
No. 662, at 406 (99th ed. 1978).
113. Generally, courts have inconsistently identified the generic basis of the action for
abusive discharge. Some courts indicate that the action is based in contract, see
Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 186-87, 344
P.2d 25, 27 (1959), but other jurisdictions allow the plaintiff to proceed on a theory of
intentional tort. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 253, 297
N.E.2d 425, 428 (1973). Still others permit a discharged employee to construct both
tort and contract causes of action. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84
N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980).
114. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). Punitive damages are unavailable to a discharged
employee under the Taft-Hartley Act. See NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357, 362 (1968).
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). Neither punitive nor compensatory damages are
available in Title VII cases. See EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 308-10
(6th Cir. 1975). But see Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 476 F. Supp. 335, 340-41 (D.N.J.
1979).
116. See text accompanying notes 37-42 supra. Indeed, most of these Maryland statutes
are couched in prohibitory rather than compensatory terms.
117. Arbitrators generally do not award compensatory or punitive damages when rein-
stating a grievant. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 356 (3d
ed. 1977).
Abusive Discharge
Adler may also undermine the right to exclusive representa-
tionl ' enjoyed by collective bargaining representatives in Mary-
land. Under the court's decision, an employee represented by a
union that has entered into a collective bargaining agreement
could foresake the grievance and arbitration provisions, if any,
contained in the contract in favor of suing the employer and possi-
bly the union in a circuit court under the theory of abusive dis-
charge. While the rationale of Hughes Tool'1 9 may preclude an
abusive discharge suit at some point in the contractual grievance
procedure, the employee is still free to frustrate the collective bar-
gaining mechanism by instituting an action in the circuit court be-
fore the grievance is filed or while it is pending. A properly certi-
fied union is the exclusive bargaining representative of all employ-
ees in the unit with regard to wages, hours, terms, and conditions
of employment.120 Consequently, any grievance procedure con-
structed by the union and the employer in the collective bargain-
ing agreement should be exhausted before an abusive discharge
action is filed. If a court's decision on a discharge is made before
the grievance procedure is conclusive, the court would be injecting
itself into the collective bargaining relationship by functioning as
a quasi-arbitrator. This, of course, conflicts with the national labor
policy favoring the settlement of employment disputes by means
agreed upon by the employer and the bargaining representative
121
and is another reason why all grievance procedures should be ex-
hausted before an action for abusive discharge is available.
118. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). The Taft-Hartley Act establishes that the employees'
duly elected representative must function as the exclusive agent to all the unit
employees for purposes of collective bargaining with regard to all terms and condi-
tions of employment. Id.
119. For a discussion of Hughes Tool see text accompanying notes 84-90 supra.
120. The Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided,
That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at
any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such
grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining represen-
tative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a col-
lective bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further,
That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present
at such adjustment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
Individual bargaining unit employees do not retain any right to bargain over
terms and conditions of employment; workers must look exclusively to the bargain-
ing representative for protection of their interests. See National Ass'n of Letter Car-
riers v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 808, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
121. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 453-54 (1957).
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V. CONCLUSION
The suggestion by Adler that there exists a need to balance
the employer's, the employee's, and the public's interests, coupled
with the court's pronouncement of a variable standard of public
policy, should produce a plethora of opportunity to define and de-
scribe further the parameters of the tort of abusive discharge in
Maryland. Until further explanation, Maryland courts will have to
reconcile Adler with specific statutory schemes describing reme-
dies for aggrieved employees. Moreover, the notion that an abu-
sive discharge action can be based upon some public policy that
has not been declared by the legislature deserves further analysis,
for it may require the courts to establish the labor policy of the
State of Maryland by defining undeclared public policy in the dis-
charge scenario. It is submitted that the long-standing status of
the at-will doctrine and the implied legislative approval of that
doctrine require that the policy-making branch of government be
heard on the development of the future protection of the
employee.
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